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ABSTRACT
We study the causal effects of financial incentives on the
quality of crowdwork. We focus on performance-based pay-
ments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to workers for pro-
ducing high quality work. We design and run randomized
behavioral experiments on the popular crowdsourcing plat-
form Amazon Mechanical Turk with the goal of understand-
ing when, where, and why PBPs help, identifying properties
of the payment, payment structure, and the task itself that
make them most effective. We provide examples of tasks
for which PBPs do improve quality. For such tasks, the
effectiveness of PBPs is not too sensitive to the threshold
for quality required to receive the bonus, while the magni-
tude of the bonus must be large enough to make the reward
salient. We also present examples of tasks for which PBPs
do not improve quality. Our results suggest that for PBPs
to improve quality, the task must be effort-responsive: the
task must allow workers to produce higher quality work by
exerting more effort. We also give a simple method to deter-
mine if a task is effort-responsive a priori. Furthermore, our
experiments suggest that all payments on Mechanical Turk
are, to some degree, implicitly performance-based in that
workers believe their work may be rejected if their perfor-
mance is sufficiently poor. Finally, we propose a new model
of worker behavior that extends the standard principal-agent
model from economics to include a worker’s subjective be-
liefs about his likelihood of being paid, and show that the
predictions of this model are in line with our experimen-
tal findings. This model may be useful as a foundation for
theoretical studies of incentives in crowdsourcing markets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing markets are platforms on which workers
around the world perform tasks for pay. In a crowdsourcing
market like Amazon Mechanical Turk, requesters post tasks
along with the amount of money that they are willing to
pay workers for their task’s completion. Workers can then
browse the available tasks and choose tasks to work on.
Crowdsourcing markets are used to conduct user stud-
ies [22], run behavioral experiments [18, 28], collect data [17,
35], test or even build business applications [1, 31], and more.
While these markets are effective at recruiting diverse la-
bor pools, the quality of work produced varies widely across
tasks and workers. The prevalence of low quality crowdwork
has inspired a growing literature on techniques to boost ac-
curacy, for example, by using redundant assignments for la-
beling tasks [15, 19, 21, 26, 34], smartly assigning tasks to
workers [14, 15], introducing social incentives [30, 33], or al-
tering financial incentives [4, 10, 12, 29, 30, 33, 36, 37]. These
solutions have had mixed success, and how to improve the
quality of work in general is still not well understood.
In this paper, we study the use of financial incentives to
encourage high quality crowdwork on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. In particular, we focus on the use of performance-
based payments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to work-
ers for producing high quality work. Previous empirical
studies of performance-based payments in crowdsourcing mar-
kets have produced mixed and somewhat contradictory rec-
ommendations. Harris [12] and Yin et al. [37] suggested that
PBPs can improve work quality, while Shaw et al. [33] found
no improvement and Yin et al. [36] found no difference in
quality when varying bonus size.
Our results explain these disparities in prior work. Fur-
thermore, we show how to generalize previous findings be-
yond the particular tasks that were studied. We design and
run experiments with the goal of understanding not just
whether PBPs improve work quality for a specific task or
bonus size, but when, why, and where they improve work
quality. We identify properties of the payment, payment
structure, and the task itself that make PBPs effective.
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In our experiments, we first identified a task (proofreading
an article) for which PBPs improve workers’ performance.
We tested the robustness of this finding by varying the pay-
ment structure and amount. We found that using PBPs
with a wide range of quality thresholds improved work qual-
ity provided the bonus awarded for exceeding the threshold
was sufficiently high. We also found that even when stan-
dard, unconditional payments are used and no explicit ac-
ceptance criteria is specified, workers may behave as if the
payments are implicitly performance-based since they be-
lieve their work may be rejected if its quality is sufficiently
low.
We examined potential reasons why PBPs improve qual-
ity. We found that simply increasing the amount of the base
payment without offering any bonus significantly improved
quality, contradicting several previous studies [2, 4, 10, 29,
30]. However, PBPs led to improved quality and lower cost
compared to a guaranteed payment of the same amount. We
also found that whether the opportunity to receive a bonus
or higher base payment is revealed before or after the task is
accepted does not make a difference in the quality of crowd-
work, ruling out the possibility that the increased quality
we observed was due (at least in part) to the reciprocity
caused by workers’ joy at receiving an unexpected bonus, as
discussed by Gilchrist et al. [10].
Finally, we investigated which properties of a particular
task allow PBPs to have an effect. We examined the con-
jecture that PBPs are more likely to improve quality on
effort-responsive tasks, tasks for which workers can produce
higher quality work by exerting additional effort. We ran
experiments on four different tasks. By taking the amount
of time workers spent on the task as the proxy measure for
their effort, we found that additional effort was correlated
with improved quality for the tasks for which PBPs helped,
but not for the tasks for which PBPs did not help. This ob-
servation yields a simple method for requesters to determine
whether or not a given task is likely to benefit from PBPs.
Based on our experimental results, we propose a simple
theoretical model of worker behavior. The model is a variant
of the standard principal-agent model from economics that
additionally incorporates workers’ subjective beliefs about
the quality of work required to be paid. We show that this
model can be used to explain our key empirical observations
which cannot be explained using the principal-agent model
alone. This model may be useful as a more realistic founda-
tion for future theoretical work on crowdsourcing markets.
Related Work. Performance-based payments have been
studied extensively outside of crowdsourcing markets. Lazear
[24] conducted a highly influential analysis of observational
data from an autoglass company that switched from paying
workers a fixed hourly rate to paying workers based on the
number of units installed, and showed that workers’ perfor-
mance significantly improved when payments were contin-
gent on work done. As another example, Gneezy and Rusti-
chini [11] gave college students fifty questions from IQ tests
to answer and found that their performance increased when
they received a bonus for answering questions correctly as
long as the bonus was sufficiently high. On the other hand,
when the bonus payment was very small, quality decreased
compared with not offering a bonus at all. The psychology
literature suggests that this is perhaps due to a decrease
in workers’ intrinsic motivation (enjoyment, responsibility,
pride) for performing well, though this theory is not univer-
sally accepted [6, 8, 9].
Camerer and Hogarth [5] performed a meta-analysis of
74 papers examining the effect of using payments contin-
gent on performance in lab experiments. They showed that
using payments contingent on performance improved the av-
erage performance of subjects for tasks in which increased
effort leads to improved performance, such as memory or
recall tasks, clerical tasks such as coding words or building
things, and problem-solving tasks. Similar meta-analyses
were performed by Jenkins Jr. et al. [20], Bonner et al. [3],
and Hertwig and Ortmann [13]. We build on and extend
this work by showing that PBPs have a causal impact on
work quality in a field setting, specifically, a crowdsourcing
environment in which eliciting high quality work is a main
concern for requesters. Moreover, we give evidence to sup-
port the conjecture of Camerer and Hogarth [5] that PBPs
work in tasks that are effort-responsive.
The results of studies on performance-based payments in
crowdsourcing markets have been mixed and sometimes dis-
couraging. On the positive side, in an early workshop paper,
Harris [12] showed that when asking workers to evaluate the
relevance of resumes, PBPs increased both performance and
the time workers spent on the task. In very recent work,
Yin et al. [37] studied a setting in which workers switched
back and forth between two types of tasks, and showed that
PBPs improved performance, especially when used immedi-
ately after a task switch.
On the negative side, Shaw et al. [33] compared fourteen
different incentive schemes, including four using PBPs,1 and
saw little variation in their effects on quality of work. How-
ever, the bonuses offered were extremely small, only 10%
($0.03) on base payments of $0.30. One might hypothesize
that the lack of effect stems from decreased intrinsic moti-
vation as in Gneezy and Rustichini [11], or that obtaining
the small bonus is simply not worth the costly additional
effort that would be required. More recently, Yin et al. [36]
studied the effect of varying the bonus size of PBPs and
found that the size of the bonus did not impact the qual-
ity of work. In their case, all bonuses offered were large
compared with the base payment ($0.04, $0.08, $0.16, or
$0.32 on a base payment of $0.01 per task), so it is possi-
ble that even their smallest bonus was large enough to elicit
the workers’ maximum effort; since Yin et al. did not in-
clude a treatment without PBPs, there is no way to know
whether PBPs boosted quality compared with offering base
payments alone. In Section 4, we give a unifying explanation
for these results. We show small bonuses in a PBP result in
little to no effect on work quality, and that it can be hard to
detect the effect between two large PBP bonuses. However,
the overall trend is that using PBPs with sufficiently high
bonuses yields better quality work.
Several additional studies have examined financial incen-
tives in crowdsourcing markets. Horton and Chilton [17]
empirically estimated workers’ reservation wages and found
1The differences in these four treatments were whether pay-
ments were described in terms of rewards for high quality or
punishments for low quality, and whether quality was mea-
sured objectively or in terms of agreement with other work-
ers’ responses. Of these, the only treatment that resulted
in performance statistically significantly different than the
control was punishing workers when their responses did not
agree with others.
that many workers aim to hit payment targets (such as mul-
tiples of $0.05). Mason and Watts [29] found that paying
workers more increased the number of tasks workers chose
to complete, but did not increase performance on each task.
That increased pay did not increase performance was ob-
served by other authors as well [4, 10, 25, 30]. In this paper,
we found that paying workers more can actually increase
their performance for some types of tasks. This disparity
can be explained by considering workers’ subjective beliefs
on how much work they must do to get their work accepted.
In prior work, workers either already performed well even
with low pay since the tasks were easy or were given addi-
tional instructions which could have primed their subjective
beliefs. In our experiments, workers are uncertain about
how much work they should do to get paid. Therefore, they
are willing to produce higher quality work to increase their
chance of having their work accepted when the payments
are higher.
Gilchrist et al. [10] showed that the manner in which the
payment is presented can influence quality. In particular,
they found that on oDesk, a crowdsourcing market for larger
tasks, initially telling workers they would receive $3 per hour
and increasing this payment to $4 after the job was accepted
led to higher performance than paying either $3 or $4 per
hour without the surprise. We show in Section 5 that this
result did not translate to the Mechanical Turk setting.
Ho et al. [16] studied the algorithmic problem of adap-
tively optimizing PBPs in crowdsourcing markets, modeling
the problem as a dynamic variant of the standard principal-
agent model from contract theory. Their model assumed
that each worker chooses how much effort to exert in or-
der to maximize his expected utility, which is simply his
expected payment minus the cost of his effort. In Section 7,
we propose a variant of this worker model that is in line with
our experimental observations. The results of Ho et al. [16]
still apply when our worker model is used in place of theirs.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Before describing our experiments, we briefly describe the
setting in which they were conducted. All of our experi-
ments were run on Amazon Mechanical Turk2 (henceforth
MTurk), one of the most popular crowdsourcing platforms.
On MTurk, requesters post tasks (HITs) for workers to com-
plete. When a worker browses a task, he sees a description
of the work to be done along with the amount of money that
the requester has offered as a base payment. A worker can
then choose whether to accept the task. After the worker
completes the chosen task, the requester may evaluate the
worker’s submission and choose to either approve or reject
the work. Each worker has an approval rating which is sim-
ply the fraction of HITs he has submitted that have been
accepted. If the work is rejected, the worker is not paid and
his approval rating, which serves as a de facto reputation
score, suffers. If the work is accepted, the worker receives
the base payment for the task and his approval rating in-
creases. Requesters also decide at this time whether or not
to award a bonus payment on top of the base, and how much
of a bonus to award. The possibility of such a bonus may or
may not be included in the task description.
HITs can also have qualifications associated with them.
Only those workers who have the appropriate qualifications
2https://mturk.com
can do a HIT. These qualifications are specified by the re-
quester. For example, we used a geographic qualification to
restrict our tasks to workers located in the United States,
and used qualifications to disallow workers from completing
the same type of task more than once. We also used quali-
fications for random assignment in one of our experiments;
how and why we did this is described in Section 5.
Our experiments focus on the use of threshold-based PBPs.
A threshold-based PBP is specified by a base payment, a
bonus payment, and a threshold. The base payment speci-
fies the amount of money a worker receives from completing
the task; this is fixed at $0.50 USD in all of our experiments.3
The bonus payment specifies the amount the worker can po-
tentially receive as a bonus. The threshold determines what
the worker must do in order to obtain the bonus.
All of the experiments in this paper were approved by the
Microsoft Research IRB.
3. DOES PBP WORK?
Our first experiment was designed with two goals in mind.
The first was to verify that PBPs can lead to higher qual-
ity crowdwork and identify a task for which this happens.
The second was to determine if there exists what we call an
implicit PBP effect: even if the requester offers a guaran-
teed payment, MTurk workers have subjective beliefs on the
quality of work they must produce in order to receive this
payment, and therefore behave as if the payments were (im-
plicitly) performance-based. We measure these subjective
beliefs by the difference in the quality of crowdwork when
base payments are explicitly guaranteed, effectively reset-
ting the workers’ subjective beliefs, compared to when base
payments are not guaranteed.
3.1 Experiment Design
In this experiment, workers were asked to proofread an
article of 500 to 700 words and correct spelling errors. For
each article, we randomly inserted 20 typos from a list of
common spelling errors. Workers were asked to input the
line number of each typo, the misspelled word, and the cor-
rect spelling of the word.
This task has two key properties. First, we would ex-
pect that workers could produce better work by exerting
more effort—the more carefully a worker reads or the more
passes a worker takes over the text, the more typos he will
find—and that this would open up the possibility of PBPs
improving quality. (We study this conjecture in more detail
in Section 6.) Second, since we injected the typos into the
text, the quality of each worker’s output could be measured
objectively, though this was not known to the workers.
Before accepting the HIT, each worker saw a preview con-
sisting of the instructions, an example article with typos,
and the base payment of $0.50 USD. The preview was the
same for all workers. After workers accepted the HIT, they
were randomly assigned to different treatments and then
shown treatment-specific instructions, when applicable. Our
experiment had a 2 × 3 design, with 2 treatments govern-
ing the base payment and 3 treatments governing the bonus
payment (if any). We discuss the bonus treatments first:
3The base payment of $0.50 was chosen so that workers
could obtain a $6 hourly rate from the base payment alone
with a reasonable amount of effort in each of our tasks.
• No Bonus: This is the control group. It had no bonus
and no mention of a bonus.
• Bonus for All: All workers earned a $1 bonus after
submitting the HIT.
• PBP: Workers earned a $1 bonus if they found 75% of
the typos found by the other workers.
The purpose of the control group was to allow us to mea-
sure the baseline number of typos workers found. The pur-
pose of the Bonus for All treatment was to test if simply
paying more resulted in higher quality work. The purpose
of the PBP bonus treatment was to test if specifically incen-
tivizing for quality improved the number of typos found.
As mentioned, we are also interested in whether workers
have subjective assumptions on how much effort they must
exert to get their work accepted. Workers may be afraid
that if they do not find a sufficient number of typos their
work will be rejected, resulting in no pay and a negatively
affected MTurk reputation. To estimate this, we designed
a treatment in which workers were explicitly guaranteed ac-
ceptance provided that they completed a very small amount
of work. We had two treatments for the base payment:
• Non-Guaranteed: There were no extra instructions. This
is the control and emulates most MTurk tasks.
• Guaranteed: Workers were told they would get paid if
they found at least one typo.
The first typo appeared before line 3 in each article. Thus
a worker would only have to do a trivial amount of work to
ensure they got paid in the guaranteed base treatment.
3.2 Results
The HIT was completed by 1,000 unique workers, who
were each assigned uniformly to one of the six treatments.
We conducted a chi-squared test to check for significant dif-
ferences in the number of participants who finished the six
treatments and found none (p = 0.38). The primary depen-
dent variable (or outcome measure) we were interested in is
the number of true typos found. In the analysis we made
six comparisons that we spell out below. We performed this
analysis using an ANOVA with one-sided, planned compar-
isons [32] and report p-values that have been corrected for
these multiple (six) comparisons. The results of this exper-
iment are shown in Figure 1 and described below.
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Figure 1: The effect of different payment schemes
on work quality in the proofreading task. Error bars
indicate the mean ± one standard error.
PBPs improve quality. To determine whether PBPs in-
crease quality for this task, we focus on the non-guaranteed
base treatments since almost all HITs on MTurk do not ex-
plicitly guarantee any kind of acceptance criteria. Workers
in the PBP bonus treatment found on average 1.3 more ty-
pos than workers in the No Bonus treatment (p = 0.042),
showing that PBPs did improve quality for this task.
All payment schemes may be implicitly performance-
based. In the No Bonus treatment, the guaranteed base
resulted in 1.5 fewer typos found on average compared with
the non-guaranteed base (p = 0.015). Similarly, in the
Bonus for All treatment, the guaranteed base resulted in
1.3 fewer typos found on average (p = 0.024). While there
may be other explanations, this suggests that workers do
have subjective beliefs on the amount of work that needs to
be done for their work to be accepted, lending support to our
conjecture that payments on MTurk are already implicitly
performance-based. We discuss this further in Section 7.
In the PBP bonus treatment, we did not see a signifi-
cantly different effect between the guaranteed base and non-
guaranteed base treatments. We offer two related explana-
tions of this finding. First, the only way to grant a bonus
using the MTurk API is to first accept the work. This means
that in the PBP bonus treatment, workers would likely be-
lieve that finding 75% of typos would almost certainly result
in their work being accepted, already altering their subjec-
tive beliefs. Second, the treatment might have made this
75% threshold more salient to the workers. This gave a
clear goal for the workers to strive for.
Simply paying more improves quality. Focusing again
on the non-guaranteed base treatment, workers in the Bonus
for All treatment found on average 1.3 more typos than
workers in the No Bonus treatment (p = 0.036). Thus offer-
ing an unconditional bonus—which is essentially just paying
more—increased quality.
This finding is perhaps surprising since it appears to con-
tradict the results of prior work [4, 29, 30]. We give two po-
tential explanations. First, since the announcement of the
bonus came after workers accepted the HIT, the workers may
be exhibiting reciprocity by doing higher quality work [10],
rewarding the requester for this pleasant surprise. We fur-
ther test and refute this hypothesis in Section 5. Second,
this could be explained by the implicit PBP effect described
above. That is, workers might have subjective beliefs about
the number of typos they must find to get paid. If we in-
crease the bonus payment, workers might be willing to put
in more effort to increase their probability of earning this
higher amount.
This observation is not inconsistent with previous work.
In most prior work, either easy tasks were chosen which
might cause workers to perform well even for low pay [4, 30]
or additional instructions or tutorials were provided which
may have primed workers’ subjective beliefs [29].
PBPs can save money compared with high uncondi-
tional payments. In the non-guaranteed base treatment,
the difference in the number of typos found in the PBP
and Bonus for All treatments is not significant. Both re-
sulted in higher quality work than the control. However, we
spent much less money on the PBP treatment. We paid each
worker $1.50 in the Bonus for All treatment, while we paid
each worker only $0.97 on average in the PBP treatment
with non-guaranteed base and $0.96 on average in the PBP
treatment with guaranteed base. Therefore, it may still be
advantageous for requesters to offer PBPs even if they could
achieve the same quality work with unconditional payments.
4. WHEN DOES PBP WORK?
Having established that PBPs can improve quality for the
proofreading task, we investigated the effect of varying two
parameters of the payment scheme, the bonus threshold and
the bonus amount, to better understand when PBPs help.
4.1 Bonus Thresholds: Experiment Design
We first tested the effect of varying the threshold of qual-
ity that must be met in order for workers to receive the
bonus. We used the same proofreading task described in
Section 3.1, with the same base payment of $0.50 and bonus
of $1. Workers were randomly assigned to treatments in
which they were told they could earn the bonus if they found
at least 5 typos or at least 25%, 75%, or 100% of the typos
found by the other workers. In the control, workers did not
receive any bonus or see any mention of a bonus.
4.2 Bonus Thresholds: Results
The results from 585 unique workers are presented in Fig-
ure 2. As before, we ran an ANOVA with one-sided, planned
comparisons [32] and report p-values that have been cor-
rected for the multiple (five) comparisons we describe below.
PBPs improve quality for a wide range of bonus
thresholds. Improvements in quality over the control can
be observed in both the 25% and 75% treatments. The 25%
treatment resulted in workers finding, on average, 1.1 more
typos than the control (p = 0.082). Similarly, the 75% treat-
ment resulted in workers finding, on average 1.2 more typos,
than the control (p = 0.049). We conjecture that setting a
threshold anywhere between 25% and 75% would yield sim-
ilar results, so the improvements from PBPs are not overly
sensitive to the threshold. However, the 100% typo condi-
tion was neither significantly different than the 75% treat-
ment or control, so our results suggest that if the bonus
threshold is set too high, then workers’ average performance
slightly decreases. This could be due to some workers giving
up because they do not believe the bonus is attainable.
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Figure 2: The effect of the bonus threshold on work
quality in the proofreading task. Error bars indicate
the mean ± one standard error.
Subjective beliefs on the quality thresholds can im-
prove work. Since each article contains 20 typos in total,
25% of the typos found by other workers is at most 5 ty-
pos and will be exactly 5 typos if the number of workers
is sufficiently large. In this sense, the two thresholds are
roughly equivalent. However, workers in the 25% treatment
performed much better than workers in the 5 typos treat-
ment. Workers in the 25% treatment found, on average, 1.9
more typos than those in the 5 typo treatment (p < .001).
An analysis of the line numbers in which typos were found
showed that workers in the 5 typo treatment did not stop
reading before workers in the 25% treatment; however, there
may be a variety of other explanations for this. For exam-
ple, it is possible that workers in the 25% group had different
subjective beliefs and thought that they would need to find
more than 5 typos to receive the bonus. After all, workers
did not know the total number of typos in the article.
4.3 Bonus Amounts: Experiment Design
We next examined the effect of varying the bonus amount.
We used the same proofreading task with a base payment of
$0.50. Workers were assigned to treatments in which they
could earn either $0.05, $0.50, or $1 if they found 75% of
the typos found by other workers. Once again, workers in
the control did not receive or see any mention of a bonus.
As an implementation detail, we note that these experi-
ments were run simultaneously with those described in Sec-
tion 4.1, allowing us to share two treatments (the control
and the $1 for 75%) and run only seven treatments in to-
tal instead of nine. We excluded workers who had already
participated in the experiment from Section 3. We collected
results from 815 unique workers assigned uniformly to the
seven treatments. A chi-squared test showed no significant
differences between the number of workers who completed
the seven treatments (p = 0.23)
4.4 Bonus Amounts: Results
We collected data from 451 unique workers. Figure 3
shows the overall trend: PBPs lead to higher quality work
only when the bonus is sufficiently large, but increasing the
bonus amount has diminishing returns. Indeed, regress-
ing the number of typos found on the bonus amount shows
that an extra $1 of bonus results in finding 1.4 more typos
(p = 0.002) on average.
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Figure 3: The effect of the bonus amount on work
quality in the proofreading task. Error bars indicate
the mean ± one standard error.
This may help to explain previous negative results on
PBPs in crowdsourcing markets. Shaw et al. [33] reported
little or no quality improvement using PBPs compared with
fixed payments. However, they offered a bonus payment of
only $0.03, 10% of their $0.30 base. As we observe from
the leftmost two points in Figure 3, PBPs do not improve
quality when the bonus is very small. Yin et al. [36] tested
PBPs with several bonus sizes and reported that bonus size
alone did not significantly impact quality. However, their
study did not include a control with fixed payments, and
the bonus sizes that they tested were all significantly larger
than their base payment ($0.04, $0.08, $0.16, and $0.32 on
a base payment of $0.01). As we observe from the rightmost
two points in Figure 3, increasing the bonus size only leads
to minor improvements in quality once the bonus is already
sufficiently large. It is only when we view the whole picture
that we can see that PBPs do help.
Taken as a whole, the results in this section show that
PBPs improve quality for a wide range of possible thresh-
olds, provided that the requester offers a bonus that is high
enough to make the extra reward salient.
5. WHY DOES PBP WORK?
There are two primary motivations for our next experi-
ment. First, we wanted to verify that PBPs are useful in
other tasks beyond finding typos. Second, we wanted to ex-
plore potential reasons why PBPs work. In particular, as
pointed out in Section 3.2, simply increasing the amount of
the bonus payment led to almost as much of an improve-
ment as using PBPs in the proofreading experiment. While
it could be that workers are responding rationally to the
provided incentives, it could also be the case that workers
are increasing their effort due to a reciprocity effect; work-
ers are pleasantly surprised to discover the opportunity to
receive a (performance-based or unconditional) bonus after
accepting the HIT, and reward the requester for this kind
action by working harder. Indeed, Gilchrist et al. [10] found,
in a different crowdsourcing context, that workers who ac-
cept a task and then receive an unexpected bonus do higher
quality work than workers who are paid the same amount
total but are told up front. This experiment is designed to
test whether this “unexpected bonus effect,” is the (partial)
cause of the observed increases in performance using PBPs.
5.1 Experiment Design
In this task, workers were shown twenty pairs of images.
Ten of the pairs were identical images, while the other ten
pairs contained minor differences. Workers were asked to
specify whether each pair was identical or not, and were not
told how many pairs of images were identical in advance.
Again, this task has two key properties we desire. First,
we speculated that workers would be more likely to spot the
differences between images if they spent more time and effort
looking. Second, we can objectively measure the quality of
workers’ output by the number of correctly answered pairs.
A similar task was used in experiments by Yin et al. [36].
To test our research questions, we wished to vary the
bonus amount and bonus rules as well as the amount of
the base payment. Obviously, if we launched two HITs that
differed only in the base payment amount, the majority of
workers would choose the HIT with the higher base pay-
ment, resulting in selection bias. To avoid this, we used the
following method for randomly assigning treatments. We
first posted a qualification HIT in which workers were paid
a small amount ($0.05) if they agreed to receive notifications
about our future tasks. We made it clear that they were un-
der no obligation to do the future tasks. We then randomly
assigned the workers who completed this recruitment task
to different treatments. For each treatment, we posted a
separate HIT. Workers were only qualified to see and do the
HIT corresponding to their assigned treatment. Finally, we
used the notifyWorkers API call to send notification emails
to workers with a link to their assigned HITs (treatments).
While others have suggested using qualifications to filter out
workers for experiments [7] or recruiting a panel of workers
in advance [28], we believe that the approach described here
is novel and of independent interest.
We next describe the treatments:
• Low Base: The base payment was $0.50. No opportu-
nity for a bonus was given. This was our control.
• High Base: The base payment was $1.50. No opportu-
nity for a bonus was given.
• Unexpected Bonus: The base payment was $0.50. After
accepting the HIT, workers were told they would receive
an additional bonus of $1.
• PBP: The base payment was $0.50. In addition to the
base payment, workers could earn a bonus of $1 if they
correctly labeled 80% of the image pairs as identical or
not. Workers were informed of the bonus and rules for
receiving the bonus before accepting the HIT.
Note that the payment amounts in the High Base and
Unexpected Bonus treatments are the same. The difference
is only how and when the payments were described.
5.2 Results
We randomly chose 800 workers from the pool that com-
pleted the qualification HIT and randomly assigned them
to the four treatments, 200 workers per treatment. Af-
ter assigning qualifications corresponding to each treatment,
we posted the HITs for each simultaneously and sent each
worker a notification with a link to their treatment’s HIT.
We conducted a chi-squared test to check for significant dif-
ferences in the number of participants who finished the four
treatments and found none (p = 0.90). In the analysis we
make six comparisons, described below. We did this anal-
ysis using an ANOVA with one-sided, planned comparisons
[32] and report p-values that have been corrected for these
multiple comparisons. The results are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The effect of different payment schemes on
work quality in the spot the differences task. Error
bars indicate the mean ± one standard error.
Similar to the proofreading experiment described in Sec-
tion 3, simply paying more resulted in higher quality work.
The High Base treatment had a significantly higher number
of correct answers than the Low Base treatment (p = 0.030).
Similarly, the Unexpected Bonus treatment had a signifi-
cantly higher number of correct answers than the Low Base
treatment (p = 0.047). Figure 4 shows no significant dif-
ference between the High Base and the Unexpected Bonus
treatments. This suggests that there was no “unexpected
bonus effect” in contrast to Gilchrist et al. [10]4 The ab-
sence of any reciprocity effect due to the unexpected bonus
suggests that workers were doing better work to increase the
probability (according to their prior assumptions) that their
work got accepted and thus earn the higher pay.
We also observe that workers in the PBP treatment out-
performed workers in all other treatments (p < 0.005). This
suggests that workers are rational to some degree and are
willing to exert more effort to increase their chances of re-
ceiving higher payments. Note that in this experiment work-
ers knew before they accepted the HIT that they could earn
a bonus, in contrast to the experiment described in Section 3
in which workers were informed of the opportunity to earn a
bonus only after they accepted the HIT. We have therefore
shown that PBPs can work whether or not the opportunity
for a bonus is unexpected.
6. WHERE DOES PBP WORK?
We have shown that PBPs incentivize higher quality crowd-
work on two specific tasks, proofreading and spotting differ-
ences in images. It is natural to ask whether our results
generalize, and in particular, what properties of a task open
up the possibility of performance improvements with PBPs.
Camerer and Hogarth [5] note that in the context of eco-
nomics lab experiments, performance-based incentives tend
to improve quality for effort-responsive tasks, tasks for which
it is possible to generate higher quality work by exerting ad-
ditional effort (presumably without requiring too much ef-
fort). One might ask if the same is true in a crowdsourcing
setting. More specifically, we investigate a hypothesis that
whether, and to what extent, a task is effort-responsive is
an important reason for whether or not PBPs work for this
task. We find an empirical correlation between the two,
which we interpret as a strong evidence in favor of this hy-
pothesis. Since it is difficult to directly measure how much
effort a worker has put into a task, we use the time a worker
spent on a HIT as a proxy measure for effort, and examine
the relationship between time spent and quality of work.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate this correlation for the
proofreading and spot-the-difference tasks respectively. Each
shows the amount of time that a worker spent on the HIT
versus the quality of his work (measured as number of typos
found or number of correctly labeled image pairs as before).
For the proofreading task, regressing the number of correct
typos found on the amount of time a worker spent shows that
every minute is correlated with finding another 0.42 typos
on average (p < 0.001). Similarly, for the spot-the-difference
task, regressing the number of pairs correctly identified on
the amount of time a worker spent shows that every minute
4 Note that our experimental setting is not the same as
theirs. They ran experiments on oDesk for tasks with much
longer working hours (3 hours) while our experiment is on
MTurk and our tasks only last for on average 8.8 minutes.
is correlated with another 0.17 correct answers (p < 0.001).
We see that, in general, workers who spent more time on
our tasks generated better quality work. We observe simi-
lar trends in all treatments, but include only workers in the
control groups in the plots since they are most comparable
across tasks. This is evidence that the tasks on which we
observed improvements from PBPs are effort-responsive.
To further explore this hypothesis and the generalizabil-
ity of our results, we examined the effects of PBPs on two
additional tasks, handwriting recognition and audio tran-
scription. For consistency with our previous experiments,
we maintained a base payment of $0.50 (adjusting the task
lengths to maintain an hourly rate of roughly $6) and a
bonus of $1 when applicable. Workers were randomly as-
signed to treatments after accepting the HIT in the same
way as in the experiments described in Sections 3 and 4.
6.1 Handwriting Recognition: Design
For the handwriting recognition task, workers were shown
two images containing handwritten text and asked to tran-
scribe the text. The images were collected from the IAM
Handwriting Database [27]. One contained 89 words and
the other 74. As in our other experiments, workers in the
control treatment received only the base payment. We also
used a PBP treatment in which workers were told that for
one of the images, their transcription would be compared
against a gold standard solution and they would receive the
bonus if they correctly transcribed 90% of the words in the
image. They were not told which image would be used to
assess their accuracy. This payment rule was used to make
the task appear more like a realistic MTurk task.
6.2 Handwriting Recognition: Results
Data was collected from 220 workers. As shown in Fig-
ure 5(c), the quality of work produced was not significantly
correlated with the time a worker spent on the task. In other
words, this task does not appear to be effort-responsive.
Moreover, we did not find a significant difference between
the accuracy of workers in the control group versus the PBP
treatment via a one-sided t-test. We note that one of the
two images given to workers was chosen because it was es-
pecially difficult for workers in a pilot study. Restricting our
analysis to just this image did show a marginal effect, with
workers in the control group averaging 92.3% accuracy and
workers in the PBP treatment averaging 93.5% (p = 0.055).
Since PBPs only had a small, marginal effect on even the
most difficult handwriting recognition image, we conclude
that PBPs only have a small effect on this task in general.
One reason why PBPs did not have a strong effect on
quality for this task may be that there was a ceiling effect,
as discussed in the context of incentives in lab experiments
by Camerer and Hogarth [5]. As Figure 5(c) shows, the aver-
age accuracy over the two articles of the workers in the con-
trol group was 95.2%, leaving little room for PBPs to have
impact. A related explanation is that most of handwritten
words in our data sets were trivial to recognize. Over 80%
of words were correctly transcribed by over 90% of workers.
It is possible that PBPs would have improved performance
if we had chosen a different threshold. However, since the
average performance was already very high, there was little
room for experimentation. If a better threshold exists, it
would be difficult for a requester to identify.
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(d) Audio Transcription
Figure 5: Time vs. quality for effort responsive tasks in panels 5(a) and 5(b), and non-effort responsive tasks
in panels 5(c) and 5(d). The blue lines indicate the regression line and the shaded areas represent the 95%
confidence interval around it. Results are similar when outliers are excluded from the analysis.
6.3 Audio Transcription: Design
For the audio transcription task, workers were asked to
transcribe 10 audio clips, each of which contained approxi-
mately 5 seconds of speech. The audio clips were collected
from VoxForge5 and we intentionally chose clips from speak-
ers with heavy accents to increase the difficulty of the task
and avoid the ceiling effect. Once again workers in the con-
trol treatment received only the base payment. We addition-
ally included three PBP treatments with different thresholds
of quality required to receive the bonus. In these treatments,
workers were told that their answers for 5 of the 10 clips
would be compared against gold standard answers, and that
they would receive the bonus if they correctly transcribed
80%, 85%, or 90% of the words respectively. These thresh-
old values were chosen based on quality observed in a pilot
experiment on this task in order to cover the range of thresh-
olds that we believed would be most likely to lead to quality
improvements with PBPs. We note that audio transcription
is one of the most common tasks on MTurk.
6.4 Audio Transcription: Results
We collected data from 400 workers. As Figure 5(d) shows,
quality and time are not significantly correlated. That is,
audio transcription does not appear to be effort-responsive.
Furthermore, we did not find a significant difference between
any of the three PBP treatments and the control group.
Since the average accuracy in the control group was only
75.4%, this cannot be fully explained by a ceiling effect as
may have been the case for handwriting recognition. One
might ask if there are certain hard words for which PBPs did
improve performance. We took a closer look at the data and
found that this does not appear to be the case. Of the 97
words included in the 10 clips, workers’ combined accuracy
was better in the 85% threshold PBP treatment compared
with the control on 52 words, and better in the control than
the 85% threshold PBP treatment on 44; essentially these
differences appear to be mostly due to noise. We observe a
similar pattern for the other PBP treatments. Additionally,
for more than 80% of the words, the percentage of workers
correctly transcribing the word when PBPs were offered is
close (within ±5%) to the percentage in the control group.
This could suggest that workers’ performance is limited by
their abilities and cannot be improved through PBPs.
6.5 A Practical Recommendation
While the results in this section are not causal, they are
in line with the hypothesis that the extent to which a task is
5http://www.voxforge.org/
effort-responsive is an important reason for whether or not
PBPs help improve quality for this task. This suggests an
approach that requesters can use when deciding whether or
not to employ PBPs in their own HIT. A requester could
run a pilot of their HIT with a small number of workers and
a fixed (not performance-based) payment and plot the time
that workers spend on the task versus the quality of their
work to determine whether and to what extent the task is
effort-responsive. A requester may be able to incentivize
higher quality using PBPs only if the task is (sufficiently)
effort-responsive. In this case, the requester must determine
whether the boost in quality is worth the extra cost of PBPs.
7. A THEORY OFWORKER INCENTIVES
The worker model in the well-known principal-agent frame-
work [23] assumes that a worker chooses a level of effort or
quality to maximize his expected utility, which is simply the
expected payment he receives minus the expected cost of
doing the work at the chosen effort level. In this section,
we show that incorporating the worker’s subjective beliefs
about how much quality is required to earn the base and
bonus payments into the worker model allows us to explain
the main observations from our experiments in a parsimo-
nious way. Furthermore, it is not clear how one might cap-
ture our experimental results using the traditional worker
model without incorporating the worker’s subjective beliefs.
Our model can be used to reason about the possible conse-
quences of using performance-based payments.
We assume that a worker views a task and chooses to
produce work at a particular quality level in order to max-
imize his expected utility, defined as his perceived expected
payment minus the perceived cost of doing the task at a
given quality level. In our model, when workers are of-
fered performance-based payments with base payment p and
bonus payment b, the worker’s expected utility is
Upbp(q) = pPr(base|q) + bPr(bonus|q)− c(q), (1)
where q is the quality level, Pr(base|q) and Pr(bonus|q) de-
note the worker’s perceived probabilities of receiving the
base and bonus payments with work of quality q, and c(q)
is the worker’s perceived cost of producing quality q. We
posit that q comes from a totally ordered set, and assume
that Pr(base|q) and Pr(bonus|q) are non-decreasing in q.
While we typically think of the cost of producing work
as positive, capturing the effort the worker must exert to
produce work of the chosen quality level, it could in some
cases be negative, capturing the subjective intrinsic utility
the worker receives from his enjoyment of the task or his
satisfaction from a job well done. To allow for such effects,
we make no assumptions on the monotonicity of c(q).
We make a minor consistent tie-breaking assumption. If
multiple quality levels maximize the expected utility for a
pair of base and bonus payments, we assume the tie is broken
consistently in the sense that the worker chooses the same
quality level for any payments leading to this particular tie.
7.1 Consequences of the Worker Model
Given the worker model, we are able to provide a coherent
explanation of our key observations, including some that
are not explained by the standard principal-agent model.
To explain the key observations from our experiments we
compare Equation 1, which describes the worker’s utility
when there are both a base payment and a bonus payment,
with the utility of a worker with subjective beliefs under the
“standard” payment scheme in which workers are offered a
base payment only. The standard payment scheme was used
in the control group in our experiments. In this case, the
worker’s expected utility is simply
Ustd(q) = pPr(base|q)− c(q). (2)
Let qstd be the quality level chosen by the worker under this
utility function, so qstd ∈ arg maxq Ustd(q), and qpbp be the
quality chosen under Equation 1, so qpbp ∈ arg maxq Upbp(q).
Subjective beliefs about acceptance criteria increase
quality. In Section 3, we experimentally showed that the
quality of work produced is higher when workers have sub-
jective beliefs about acceptance criteria than when the base
payment is explicitly guaranteed. We called this an implicit
PBP. It is easy to explain in our model.
Consider the standard setting (no PBPs). With a guar-
anteed base payment, the worker’s utility becomes p− c(q).
Let q∗ be a maximizer of this expression. It follows that
q∗ is a minimizer of c(q), thus c(q∗) ≤ c(q) for all q. For
any q < q∗, we have pPr(base|q) ≤ pPr(base|q∗) given
the monotonicity of Pr(base|q). Therefore, for any q < q∗,
Ustd(q) ≤ Ustd(q∗). Given the consistent tie-breaking as-
sumption, the worker will not choose to generate work of
quality q if q < q∗. Therefore, if qstd is the maximizer of
Equation 2 then qstd ≥ q∗. Thus qstd, the optimal quality
level with no guaranteed base payment, is greater than or
equal to q∗, the optimal quality level with guaranteed base
payment, which we observed experimentally in Figure 1.
It is possible to strengthen this result to strict inequality
(qstd > q
∗) with a few additional assumptions.6 Similar
arguments can be made for the setting with PBPs.
Higher payments increase quality. The experiments
in Sections 3 and 4 demonstrated that increasing the base
payment (or the unconditional bonus) can increase quality.
This is also easy to explain in our model. Consider increasing
the base payment in the standard setting (no PBPs). Let qδ
be the maximizer of Uδ(q) = (p + δ) Pr(base|q) − c(q), the
6In multiple places in this section, to make inequalities on
quality strict, we could first assume that q takes values on
some interval [qmin, qmax] such that c(qmax) > b+p, and that
Pr(base|q), Pr(bonus|q), and c(q) are differentiable on this
interval. We must then also assume that the subjective prob-
abilities Pr(base|q) and Pr(bonus|q) are strictly increasing
in q. In this particular instance, under these assumptions,
since c′(q∗) = 0, we have U ′std(q
∗) > 0, which implies that
q∗ cannot be the maximizer of U ′std(q
∗), so qstd > q∗.
utility of the worker if the base payment were p+ δ instead
of p, where δ > 0. By optimality of qstd, for all q,
pPr(base|q)− c(q) ≤ pPr(base|qstd)− c(qstd).
Since Pr(base|q) is non-decreasing in q, q < qstd implies
δPr(base|q) ≤ δPr(base|qstd). Combining the last two in-
equalities, Uδ(q) ≤ Uδ(qstd) for all q < qstd. Therefore, given
the consistent tie-breaking assumption, qδ, the optimal qual-
ity level under higher pay, is greater than or equal to qstd,
the optimal quality level under the standard setting. Again,
strict inequality is achievable with the additional assump-
tions from Footnote 6. Similar arguments can be made for
increasing the base payment with PBPs, and for increasing
the bonus payment.
These conclusions hold only when uncertainty about re-
ceiving the payment is included. They would not hold in the
standard principal-agent model, where increasing a guaran-
teed payment does not increase quality.
Performance-based payments (significantly) increase
quality. A key result from our experiments in Sections 3-5
is that PBPs can, in fact, increase quality in a significant
way. This can be explained from our model too.
We have that the quality improves (qpbp ≥ qstd, or qpbp >
qstd with additional assumptions) as a special case of the
argument above. However, this statement is relatively weak,
as it does not say anything about the magnitude of the im-
provement, i.e., the difference qpbp− qstd. We would like this
difference to be large; a requester might not want to take on
the extra costs of PBPs if the increase in quality is small.
In order to gain some intuition for when it is or is not possi-
ble to obtain a sufficiently large improvement in quality, we
consider several special cases as examples.
As a first example, consider the case in which the worker
does not have fine-grained control over the precise quality
of his work, but can only choose between two options: high-
quality, denoted qhigh, or low quality, qlow. Then PBPs work
if and only if the worker’s optimal quality level is qlow with-
out PBPs, and qhigh with PBPs. In formulas, Ustd(qhigh) <
Ustd(qlow) and Upbp(qhigh) > Upbp(qlow), or
p (Pr(base|qhigh)− Pr(base|qlow)) < c(qhigh)− c(qlow)
< p (Pr(base|qhigh)− Pr(base|qlow)) +
b (Pr(bonus|qhigh)− Pr(bonus|qlow)) .
In words, the extra cost to produce high-quality work must
be less than the extra benefit the worker would receive in
terms of expected payments if the bonus is included, and
bigger than the extra benefit he would receive with stan-
dard payments. Examining this expression gives us intu-
ition about when we might expect PBPs to help. First,
c(qhigh) − c(qlow) cannot be too large. It must be possible
for the worker to substantially increase his quality with ad-
ditional effort (and at a reasonable cost)—essentially, the
task must be effort-responsive, as conjectured in Section 6.
Second, c(qhigh) − c(qlow) cannot be too small (in particu-
lar, compared with Pr(base|qhigh)− Pr(base|qlow) and p) or
PBPs are unnecessary to achieve high quality. This is a par-
tial explanation for why we did not see improvements from
PBPs in the handwriting recognition task when the cost of
producing high quality was already small. Third, the bonus
b must be set large enough. This could partially explain
our observation that PBPs did not help in the proofread-
ing task with a very small bonus. Finally, the difference
Pr(bonus|qhigh)−Pr(bonus|qlow) must be high enough. This
could explain why we observed that PBPs did not help when
the threshold for receiving a bonus is set too low.
As a second tractable example, suppose that the worker
has fine-grained control over quality, but has no uncertainty
over whether the bonus will be obtained, i.e.,
Pr(bonus|q) =
{
1 if q ≥ q¯
0 otherwise
for some threshold value q¯. It is easy to show that either
qpbp = qstd (if the worker prefers to do less work and pass
up the bonus) or qpbp ≥ q¯ (if the worker prefers to do more
work to receive the bonus). PBPs are useful if and only if
q¯ is sufficiently higher than qstd (according to the needs of
the requester), and for some q ≥ q¯, Upbp(q) > Upbp(qstd), or
equivalently
c(q)− c(qstd) < p(Pr(base|q)− Pr(base|qstd)) + b. (3)
Again we see that for PBPs to help it must be possible for
the worker to increase his quality with additional effort at a
reasonable cost, and the bonus must be set sufficiently large.
Equation 3 provides a concrete and simple way to think
about whether it would help to increase the bonus threshold
q¯. For fixed payments p and b, it is optimal to choose as q¯ the
largest q which satisfies Equation 3. However, q¯ is a perceived
threshold and cannot always be controlled directly. Instead,
it may help to alter workers’ perception, perhaps without
even changing the objective bonus rule. For example, in
the proofreading experiment from Section 4 the “5 typos”
bonus rule is roughly equivalent to the “25%” bonus rule
in terms of when bonus payments are awarded, yet workers
react differently. One possible explanation for this general
phenomenon is a difference in the perceived value q¯.
7.2 Comparison with Principal-Agent Model
In the standard principal-agent model, a worker maxi-
mizes his payment minus the intrinsic cost of his effort.
We deviate from the standard model in that we include the
worker’s subjective beliefs about how high quality his work
must be to be paid. In particular, while the objective proba-
bility of receiving the base payment is often 1, the subjective
probability may be much smaller, depending on the quality
level. This feature allows us to capture some effects that
are not captured by the standard model, e.g., that increas-
ing the base payment may increase the quality of work that
the worker chooses to produce, while removing uncertainty
about the base payment may decrease quality.
Our model may be useful as a more realistic foundation for
theoretical work. As an example, consider Ho et al. [16], a
recent theoretical paper on the optimization of PBPs. While
that paper posits the standard principal-agent model, all
results carry over to our model. (A proof of this fact is
omitted due to space constraints.)
8. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We describe the results of a series of experiments studying
the effect of performance-based payments on the quality of
crowdwork on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our goal is to
identify properties of the payment, payment structure, and
task that allow for quality improvements using PBPs.
We find that PBPs can improve the quality of submit-
ted work for some tasks, but are not likely to for others.
We identify the extent to which a task is effort-responsive
as a potential important reason for whether or not PBPs
work for this task. This leads to an actionable insight for
requesters. When considering whether or not to use PBPs,
one could first run a pilot experiment to determine whether
a task is effort-responsive by examining the correlation be-
tween time spent and quality. If additional time spent leads
to a sufficiently high boost in quality, we would expect PBPs
to improve performance.
We find strong evidence for what we call the implicit PBP
effect : workers may have their own subjective beliefs about
the quality of work they must submit to have their work
accepted, which makes them view fixed payments as im-
plicitly performance-based. Workers may also have subjec-
tive beliefs about the likelihood of receiving the bonus when
payments are explicitly performance-based. This should be
taken into account when designing a payment scheme. For
example, we find that in some cases a requester can incen-
tivize higher quality work by defining the bonus threshold
relative to other workers or with respect to gold standard
data that the workers do not have access to.
We show that in order for PBPs to improve quality, the
bonus payment offered must be sufficiently large, but that
there are diminishing returns for further increasing this pay-
ment. This partially explains existing negative results on the
effectiveness of PBPs in crowdsourcing markets. We provide
evidence that when PBPs improve quality, they do so for a
wide range of quality thresholds.
Finally, we suggest a theoretical model of workers’ behav-
ior that captures all of the above effects and explains several
outcomes we observed in our experiments. We believe this
model may be useful in further work on crowdsourcing mar-
kets, both as a concrete way to think about the consequences
of using this or that payment scheme in practice, and as a
more realistic foundation for theoretical work compared to
the standard principal-agent model.
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